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RETHINKING EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
Eva Sharf* 
Abstract: The people’s right to referendum in Washington State is substantively limited in 
only one way: the people cannot block through referendum “such laws as may be necessary 
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state 
government and its existing public institutions.”1 This emergency exception to the referendum 
power must be explicitly invoked by the Washington State Legislature in what is called an 
“emergency clause.” Washington courts are willing to review emergency clauses to determine 
if a bill is, in fact, “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or 
safety.” However, the courts have failed to articulate a coherent rule for deciding whether a 
bill meets that standard.2 As a result, the Legislature routinely exempts from referendum bills 
that do not address traditional emergencies—a practice that has been widely criticized. 
To strike the right balance between the people’s referendum right and the Legislature’s 
need to effectuate certain laws immediately, the courts should reexamine the purpose of the 
emergency exception. This Comment proposes a standard for evaluating whether a bill 
addresses an emergency. To meet that standard, the bill must accomplish a public purpose that 
would be substantially destroyed if the Legislature was unable to act immediately. This 
standard would allow the Legislature to effectively address circumstances that fail to resemble 
traditional emergencies but nevertheless require immediate action. This standard is also 
consistent with a key policy reason behind Washington’s emergency exception: preventing a 
small minority (4% of voters required for a referendum) from undermining the ability of the 
majority’s elected representatives to fulfill their legislative duty. 
  
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I wish to thank Professor 
Hugh Spitzer for his thoughtful input and insightful comments, Marten King and Malori McGill for 
their helpful feedback at various stages of this Comment's development, and the editors at Washington 
Law Review for their valuable suggestions. 
1. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
2. Id. 
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“It might be illegal to yell ‘Fire!’ under false pretenses in a crowded 
movie house, but yelling ‘Emergency!’ on the floor of the state legislature 




This quote, the opening line of a Stranger article from 2005, 
exemplifies a common criticism of the referendum system in Washington: 
the Legislature declares bills “emergency legislation” solely to avoid a 
referendum.4 The right to referendum allows the general public to block 
acts by the Legislature from taking effect unless they survive a public 
vote.5 Any person may initiate this procedure by gathering signatures that 
amount to 4% of the votes cast during the previous gubernatorial election.6 
A successful referendum petition will delay a bill from taking effect until 
it is voted on during the next general election.7 To avoid the possibility of 
a referendum, the Legislature can include an “emergency clause” in a bill, 
indicating that the bill addresses an emergency and must take effect 
immediately.8 
The Legislature is often criticized for invoking its emergency 
legislative power when a bill does not resemble a traditional emergency, 
such as a public health crisis or natural disaster.9 But those criticisms are 
misguided. In seeking to confine emergency clauses to bills addressing 
traditional health and safety emergencies, the Legislature’s critics have 
                                                     
3. Stefan Sharkansky, State of Emergency, THE STRANGER: SOUND BITE (May 19, 2005), 
https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/sound-bite/Content?oid=21434 [https://perma.cc/S95A-JHU6]. 
4. Id. 
5. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
6. Id. (“The number of valid signatures of registered voters required on a petition for referendum 
of an act of the legislature or any part thereof, shall be equal to or exceeding four percent of the votes 
cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the filing of the text of the 
referendum measure with the secretary of state.”). Referendum petitions originally required 6% of 
legal voter signatures but no more than thirty-thousand total; amendment 30 reduced this requirement 
to 4% of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. Philip A. Trautman, Initiative and Referendum 
in Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L. REV. 55, 57 (1973). The signature requirement for an initiative 
is higher, at 8%. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a). 
7. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(d). 
8. OFFICE OF THE CODE REVISER, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019, pt. II, 
§ 11(k), at 21 (2019) [hereinafter BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019], http://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/ 
Documents/2019BillDraftingGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94A-UMSJ]. 
9. See, e.g., Sharkansky, supra note 3.  
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misconceived the purpose of the emergency exception.10 A close look at 
the emergency exception shows that the Legislature should be able to 
respond immediately to a limited number of other circumstances that do 
not resemble traditional emergencies but do require prompt action.11 
Article II, section 1(b) of the Washington Constitution substantively 
limits the people’s right to referendum in only one way: the people cannot 
block through referendum “such laws as may be necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of 
the state government and its existing public institutions.”12 This type of 
emergency exception—a public safety exception—is common among 
states that have adopted the referendum power.13 Of the twenty-three 
states that have statewide referendum powers in their constitutions,14 
about half of the constitutions include some version of an emergency 
exception.15 The reasoning is relatively simple: an unfettered right to 
                                                     
10. See infra Part V.  
11. See infra Part V. 
12. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
13. See infra note 14. 
14. These states include (listed by year that the referendum process was adopted): South Dakota 
(1898), Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Nevada (1904), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan 
(1908), Missouri (1908), Maine (1909), Arkansas (1909), Colorado (1910), Arizona (1910), New 
Mexico (1911), California (1912), Idaho (1912), Nebraska (1912), Ohio (1912), Washington (1912), 
North Dakota (1914), Maryland (1915), Massachusetts (1918), Alaska (1958), and Wyoming (1967). 
Chip Lowe, Public Safety Legislation and the Referendum Power: A Reexamination, 37 HASTINGS 
L.J. 591, 592 n.8 (1986). 
15. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“The referendum shall not be applied to dedications of revenue, 
to appropriations, to local or special legislation, or to laws necessary for the immediate preservation 
of the public peace, health, or safety.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3) (“[E]xcept laws 
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or for the support 
and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state institutions”); CAL. CONST. 
art. II, § 9(a) (“[E]xcept urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax 
levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.”); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“[E]xcept 
as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, and 
appropriations for the support and maintenance of the departments of state and state institutions”); 
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16 (“An emergency bill shall include only such measures as are 
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety; and shall not include 
(1) an infringement of the right of home rule for municipalities, (2) a franchise or a license to a 
corporation or an individual to extend longer than one year, or (3) provision for the sale or purchase 
or renting for more than 5 years of real estate.”); MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(a) (“[E]xcept as to laws 
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and laws making 
appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state 
institutions and for the support of public schools”); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[E]xcept general 
appropriation laws; laws providing for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety; for the 
payment of the public debt or interest thereon, or the creation or funding of the same, except as in this 
constitution otherwise provided; for the maintenance of the public schools or state institutions, and 
local or special laws.”); OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(d) (“Laws providing for tax levies, appropriations 
for the current expenses of the state government and state institutions, and emergency laws necessary 
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referendum would allow a small minority16 to block legislation that needs 
to be enacted quickly, thereby undermining the state legislature’s ability 
to do its job.17 The objective of an emergency exception is to strike a 
balance between the people’s right to referendum and the legislature’s 
need to carry out certain laws immediately.18 
To signal that a bill is exempt from a referendum, the Legislature 
attaches an emergency clause containing the article II, section 1(b) 
language.19 That is where things get murky. Although the Washington 
State Supreme Court is willing to review emergency clauses to ensure that 
they satisfy article II section 1(b)’s requirements, it has failed to articulate 
a coherent rule for determining whether those requirements are met.20 
Particularly, the Court has offered inconsistent guidance for whether an 
act is “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 
health or safety.”21 In doing so, the Court has oscillated between a narrow 
interpretation of the language22 and a standard that gives the Legislature 
                                                     
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, shall go into immediate effect.”); 
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“[E]xcept as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public 
peace, health, or safety”); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(3)(a), § 28 (Under § 1(3)(a), “The people reserve 
to themselves the referendum power, which is to approve or reject at an election any Act, or part 
thereof, of the Legislative Assembly that does not become effective earlier than 90 days after the end 
of the session at which the Act is passed.” Under § 28, no act shall take effect until 90 days after the 
end of the session “except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, 
or in the body of the law”); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“[E]xcept such laws as may be necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its 
existing public institutions.”); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(g) (“The referendum shall not be applied to 
dedications of revenue, to appropriations, to local or special legislation, or to laws necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.”) 
16. To place a referendum measure on the ballot in Washington, one must gather signatures 
amounting to 4% of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
17. See State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 267, 148 P. 28, 30 (1915). 
18. See State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 380 P.2d 735, 738 (1963) 
(“[T]here is a most delicate balance between the emergent powers of the legislature and the people’s 
right of referendum.”). 
19. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019, supra note 8, at 21. 
20. Bryan L. Page, State of Emergency: Washington’s Use of Emergency Clauses and the People’s 
Right to Referendum, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 222 (2008). 
21. The emergency exception has been interpreted as two separate exceptions. Farris v. Munro, 99 
Wash. 2d 326, 336, 662 P.2d 821, 827 (1983). The second exception, “support of the state government 
and its existing public institutions,” has been reviewed more frequently by the courts, and the rule is 
better developed. See generally Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28. Although there is still some 
uncertainty around the second exception (the support-of-the-state-government exception), this 
Comment focuses primarily on the first exception, the public safety exception, which covers laws 
“necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” Farris, 99 Wash. 2d 
at 336, 662 P.2d at 827. 
22. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 318, 147 P. 11, 16–17 (1915) (adopting 
a narrow interpretation of the public safety exception). 
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more wiggle room (for example, upholding an emergency clause in a bill 
financing a baseball stadium).23 Therefore, aside from waiting for courts 
to make determinations on an ad hoc basis, there is no clear method to 
predict whether an emergency clause is valid. The absence of a clear rule 
is openly acknowledged in case law24 and in academic literature.25 
The most perplexing case evaluating an emergency clause is CLEAN v. 
State,26 in which the Washington State Supreme Court held that a bill 
financing construction of a baseball stadium was validly exempt from a 
referendum.27 Critics of the decision fail to see how funding a stadium 
could possibly constitute an emergency.28 This reaction is understandable; 
financing a baseball stadium hardly seems comparable to a traditional 
emergency, and it is intuitively appealing to define “emergency” in the 
traditional sense. However, this Comment argues that the desire to cabin 
the emergency exception to traditional emergencies is misguided because 
it fails to address other scenarios that legitimately require immediate 
action. 
This Comment proposes a standard for evaluating whether a bill fits 
within the public safety exception to the right to referendum. The public 
safety exception should exempt a bill from a referendum where the bill 
accomplishes a public purpose and where that purpose would be 
substantially thwarted if the Legislature was unable to act immediately. 
This standard encompasses two scenarios requiring prompt action: 
(1) cases where the harm is so severe that an immediate response is 
necessary to mitigate ongoing damage, and (2) instances where a law’s 
purpose would be irreparably undermined if the effective date were 
delayed pending referral. This standard provides clarity in determining 
whether a bill addressing a non-traditional emergency warrants exemption 
                                                     
23. See, e.g., CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 805, 928 P.2d 1054, 1065 (1996) (adopting a 
broad interpretation of the public safety exception compared to that in Brislawn). 
24. State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777–78, 380 P.2d 735, 738–39 (1963) 
(“[I]n almost every prior decision on this point, the court was divided, or there was a concurring 
opinion based on reasons different from those expressed by the majority . . . . It would be inaccurate 
to say that our former decisions have been consistent in discussing and announcing the rule to be 
applied.”). 
25. Trautman, supra note 6, at 72 (“The court has interpreted this provision in a series of not always 
consistent cases.”); Page, supra note 20, at 222 (“[C]ourts have been marred in confusion when 
deciding cases challenging the validity of emergency clauses.”). 
26. 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996). 
27. Id. at 782, 928 P.2d at 1054. 
28. See Emergency Clause Reform Scheduled for Public Hearing, WASH. POLICY CTR (Jan. 24, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/detail/emergency-clause-reform-scheduled-
for-public-hearing [https://perma.cc/EVQ6-K836] (last updated Jan. 28, 2013); CLEAN, 130 Wash. 
2d at 825 (Sanders, J. dissenting). 
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under the clause and will also preclude the Legislature from misusing 
emergency clauses to avoid a referendum. 
By holding the Legislature accountable to a concrete definition of 
emergency, this proposed standard also addresses a major criticism of the 
Legislature’s use of emergency clauses: that the Legislature improperly 
exempts bills from referendum that do not address traditional 
emergencies. Currently, the perception of improper use of emergency 
clauses comes from the absence of a clear standard for evaluating whether 
a bill falls under the public safety exception.29 Because the Legislature 
and courts have failed to articulate why certain non-traditional 
emergencies require exemption, they appear to be ignoring the scope of 
the public safety exception. This perception is bolstered when the 
Legislature attaches an emergency clause to legislation addressing issues 
that do not resemble traditional emergencies, such as public health crises 
or natural disasters.30 But by clearly defining “emergency,” this 
Comment’s standard would place the Legislature on notice of what a valid 
emergency clause looks like. At the same time, it would give the public a 
standard by which to judge emergency clauses. As a result, the Legislature 
would be less likely to misuse emergency clauses to avoid a referendum, 
and the public would be less likely to misjudge the Legislature’s behavior.  
This Comment also rejects the primarily procedural solutions that 
critics of the emergency clause have proposed. These solutions (e.g., 
requiring a supermajority vote to pass bills with emergency clauses)31 
attempt to make it more challenging to attach an emergency clause to a 
bill. However, they fail to address the underlying issue: Washington law 
has yet to coherently define what should constitute an emergency.32 By 
looking to the purpose of the emergency exception to define “emergency,” 
this Comment shows that procedural solutions are either inconsistent with 
that purpose or unhelpful absent a coherent definition of emergency. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the people’s right to 
referendum in Washington. Part II explains the technical requirements for 
                                                     
29. Sharkansky, supra note 3 (“Hardly any of these bills address palpable emergencies like 
hurricanes or terrorist attacks.”). 
30. Emergency Clause Reform Scheduled for Public Hearing, supra note 28 (asserting that 
emergency clauses should only validly apply for “true public emergencies, like a large-scale natural 
disaster or wide-spread epidemic disease”). 
31. Page, supra note 20, at 271–79. 
32. See State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777–78, 380 P.2d 735, 738–39 (1963) 
(“It would be inaccurate to say that our former decisions have been consistent in discussing and 
announcing the rule to be applied.”); see also Page, supra note 20, at 222 (“[C]ourts have been marred 
in confusion when deciding cases challenging the validity of emergency clauses.”); Trautman, supra 
note 6, at 72 (“The court has interpreted this provision in a series of not always consistent cases.”). 
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and the historical use of both referendum measures and emergency clauses 
in Washington. Part III examines judicial review of emergency clauses. 
Part IV describes how the public has criticized emergency declarations 
and surveys proposed reforms to the referendum process. Finally, Part V 
proposes a standard for evaluating emergency clauses. The proposed 
standard is consistent with Washington case law but provides a simpler 
and more workable definition of emergency. 
I. THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO REFERENDUM IN WASHINGTON 
In 1912, Washington State adopted, through amendment VII to the 
Washington Constitution, an initiative and referendum process.33 The 
right to referendum gives the people power to refer acts of the Washington 
Legislature to a public vote before they become law.34 Essentially, a 
referendum measure requires that a statute adopted by the Legislature be 
approved or rejected by the people before taking effect.35 This right to 
block legislative acts is considered an important check on the 
government.36 For example, the referendum power enhances legislative 
accountability to the people by forcing the Legislature to consider how 
the public will respond to its actions.37 Although the original Washington 
State Constitution, adopted in 1889, did not include an initiative and 
referendum clause, article I, section 1, stated that “[a]ll political power is 
inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”38 Washington expressly reserved to the people 
the right to initiative and referendum following a nationwide trend toward 
restricting representative government and strengthening direct 
                                                     
33. Trautman, supra note 6, at 55. 
34. Id.; OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON STATE 3 (2017), 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/initiative%20and%20referenda%20handbook%
202017%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DT9-QZB5] (last visited Aug. 14, 2019, 8:41 AM) [hereinafter 
INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON]. 
35. Jeffrey T. Even, Direct Democracy in Washington: A Discourse on the Peoples’ Powers of 
Initiative and Referendum, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 247, 251 (1996). 
36. Page, supra note 20, at 234. 
37. Id. (“The referendum forces the legislature to think about how the people will react to 
legislation if enacted. Legislatures are often reluctant to pass bills that might mobilize referendum 
efforts to strike down the law.”). 
38. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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democracy.39 By some accounts, the intent of amendment VII was to give 
“maximum power to the people in relation to the legislature.”40 
Although the people’s right to referendum is viewed as an important 
check on the Legislature, it is not unlimited. Amendment VII contains an 
“emergency exception,” which limits the public’s right to referendum.41 
Article II, section 1(b) exempts from referendum power “such laws as 
may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 
health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public 
institutions.”42 Thus, a bill containing article II, section 1(b) language (for 
instance, a bill containing an emergency clause)43 is exempt from a 
referendum and cannot be delayed or ultimately blocked by a popular 
vote.44 
In addition to adding the right to initiative and referendum, 
amendment VII also eliminated a requirement that emergency measures 
be approved by two-thirds of each house.45 Originally, laws (other than 
appropriations bills) took effect ninety days after adjournment of the 
session in which they were enacted.46 However, in cases of emergency, a 
law could take effect before the ninety-day period if the Legislature 
included a declaration of emergency in the act and if two-thirds of each 
house voted for the measure.47 After amendment VII was enacted, 
emergency measures no longer required approval by two-thirds of each 
house.48 
While the right to referendum is an important form of direct democracy 
in Washington, the right is not without limits. The emergency exception 
in article II, section 1(b) fundamentally limits the availability of the 
referendum.49 This Comment explores the appropriate balance between 
                                                     
39. Trautman, supra note 6, at 55; see also Even, supra note 35, at 253 (“In 1898, South Dakota 
became the first state to adopt the initiative and referendum. Between 1898 and 1918, 23 states 
adopted at least one form of direct democracy.”). 
40. Trautman, supra note 6, at 68. 
41. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
42. Id. 
43. The draft bill guide includes the following standard emergency clause language based on Art. 
II § 1(b): “[t]his act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, 
or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect (immediately 
or a specific date).” BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019, supra note 8, at 21. 
44. Trautman, supra note 6, at 72. 
45. Page, supra note 20, at 224. 
46. WASH. CONST. art II § 31, repealed by WASH. CONST. amend. VII.  
47. Id. 
48. Page, supra note 20, at 224. 
49. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
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the people’s right and the Legislature’s need to avoid a referendum in 
certain circumstances. 
II. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR, AND HISTORICAL USE 
OF, REFERENDUM MEASURES AND EMERGENCY 
CLAUSES IN WASHINGTON 
A. Referendum Measures 
The procedures for filing a referendum measure are fairly 
straightforward. Any registered voter may file a petition for referendum.50 
A referendum may target all or part of a statute.51 To successfully refer an 
act of the Legislature to the ballot, a petitioner must gather signatures from 
legal voters that amount to at least 4% of the votes cast during the previous 
gubernatorial election.52 The petitioner must then file their petition with 
the Secretary of State after the governor signs the bill into law (which 
could happen before or after the legislative session is adjourned)53 and no 
later than ninety days after adjournment of the session in which the bill 
was passed.54 Once the Office of the Secretary of State certifies the 
referendum petition, the statute is suspended and the referendum measure 
is submitted to a public vote in the next state general election.55 
Referendum measures are accepted or rejected by a simple majority 
vote.56 If the people vote to support the Legislature and the bill is therefore 
enacted, it cannot be amended or repealed within a period of two years 
following its enactment unless two-thirds of each house vote to overturn 
                                                     
50. There are two types of referenda: referendum measures (laws passed by the legislature but 
referred to a public vote by referendum petition) and referendum bills (proposed laws referred to a 
public vote by the Legislature). At issue here are referendum measures. See INITIATIVES & 
REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON, supra note 34, at 8. 
51. Id.  
52. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). (“The number of valid signatures of registered voters required on 
a petition for referendum of an act of the legislature or any part thereof, shall be equal to or exceeding 
four percent of the votes cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the 
filing of the text of the referendum measure with the secretary of state.”). Referendum petitions 
originally required 6% of legal voter signatures but no more than thirty-thousand total signatures; 
amendment 30 reduced this requirement to 4% of votes cast for in the last gubernatorial election. 
Trautman, supra note 6, at 57. The signature requirement for an initiative is higher: 8%. WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
53. Even, supra note 35, at 260–61. 
54. Id. at 260. 
55. INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON, supra note 34, at 13. 
56. Id. at 9. An exception is that gambling and lottery measures require 60% approval. See id.  
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the bill.57 If the referendum measure successfully blocks the Legislature, 
the bill will not go into effect.58 
Many referendum measures fail to make the ballot because of the 
difficulty of gathering signatures. From 1912 to the present, eighty-two 
referendum measures have been proposed, but only thirty-seven have 
been placed on the ballot for public vote.59 Of the referendum measures 
that did not make the ballot, thirty-one did not submit signatures, eight 
were withdrawn by the sponsor, two were submitted with insufficient 
signatures, two were blocked because of emergency clauses, one was filed 
prematurely, and one was blocked by a writ of prohibition.60 Out of the 
referendum measures that successfully qualified for a spot on the ballot, 
the public overturned the Legislature thirty times and supported the 
Legislature seven times.61 
B. Emergency Clauses 
Beyond procedural hurdles such as the signature requirement, the only 
substantive limit on the right to referendum is the emergency exception 
outlined in article II, section 1(b). To take advantage of the emergency 
exception, the Legislature attaches to a bill an emergency clause 
containing article II, section 1(b) language. A valid emergency clause 
exempts the bill from a referendum. 
Fifteen percent of bills enacted by the Legislature from 1997 until 2012 
included emergency clauses.62 The Legislature used those emergency 
clauses in a wide variety of bills, including bills providing funding for the 
Seattle Mariners’s (a Major League Baseball team) stadium63; adopting 
California’s vehicle standards64; requiring the use of apprentices on public 
                                                     
57. WASH. CONST. art. II § 1 (“No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting 
thereon shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years following such 
enactment. Provided, that any such act, law, or bill may be amended within two years after such 
enactment at any regular or special session of the legislature by a vote of two-thirds of all the members 
elected to each house with full compliance with section 12, Article III of the Washington Constitution 
and no amendatory law adopted in accordance with this provision shall be subject to referendum.”). 
58. INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON, supra note 34, at 8. 





62. Emergency Clause Reform Scheduled for Public Hearing, supra note 28. 
63. S.B. 6049, 54th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1995), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/1995-
96/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6049-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRC4-LKMU]. 
64. H.B. 1397, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2005-
 
19 - Sharf.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2019  3:34 PM 
2019] RETHINKING EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 1487 
 
work projects65; establishing family and medical leave insurance66; and 
securitizing a portion of the state’s revenue from a tobacco litigation 
settlement agreement.67 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EMERGENCY CLAUSES 
A. Standard of Review 
Washington allows for judicial review of whether the Legislature 
appropriately used an emergency clause.68 Although they have not always 
done so, the courts apply a deferential standard of review under which 
they will find that an emergency exists unless the Legislature’s declaration 
of emergency is “obviously false and a palpable attempt at 
dissimulation.”69 More specifically, Washington courts consistently cite 
the following language: 
[S]uch legislative declaration of emergency and necessity for the 
enactment is conclusive and must be given effect, unless the 
declaration on its face is obviously false; and, in determining the 
truth or falsity of the legislative declaration, we will enter upon 
no inquiry as to the facts, but must consider the question from 
what appears upon the face of the act, aided by the court’s judicial 
knowledge. We must give to the action of the legislature and its 
declaration of an emergency every favorable presumption.70 
Put differently, the Washington State Supreme Court does not undertake 
its own factual inquiry but instead looks at the Legislature’s act on its face, 
aided only by judicially noticeable facts.71 Thus, the Court defers to the 
Legislature’s declaration of an emergency unless it is obviously dubious, 
giving the Legislature “every favorable presumption.”72 
                                                     
06/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/1397-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6J9-AFFU]. 
65. S.B. 5097, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2005-
06/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5097-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G5E-8AH7]. 
66. S.B. 5659, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2007-
08/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5659-S2.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6QR-SZ3F]. 
67. S.B. 6828, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2001-
02/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6828.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4HK-Y326]. 
68. Even, supra note 35, at 283. 
69. Id. 
70. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 807, 928 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1996); State ex rel. Hoppe 
v. Meyers, 58 Wash. 2d 320, 326, 363 P.2d 121, 125 (1961)).  
71. Even, supra note 35, at 283–84. 
72. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 807, 928 P.2d at 1066 (citing Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 
778, 380 P.2d 735, 739 (1963)). 
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The Court, however, has not always applied such a deferential standard 
of review.73 In some early cases, the Court treated the question of whether 
the emergency clause was properly used as a question of law.74 In State 
ex rel. Case v. Howell,75 a 1915 decision, the Court declined to defer to 
the Legislature’s declaration of emergency: “[t]he said legislative 
declaration has no greater effect, and is no more binding upon the court, 
than if the Legislature had declared that a certain measure is or is not 
constitutional. In such contingency that question would still remain for 
the courts to determine.”76 Thus, the Court reviewed the matter de novo.77 
But in another 1915 case, the Court stated that “[i]f the act be doubtful, 
the question of emergency will be treated as a legislative question and the 
doubt resolved in favor of the declaration of emergency made by the 
legislative body.”78 Despite these early inconsistencies, courts appear to 
have adopted the deferential standard of review.79 
B. History and Meaning of the Emergency Exception 
Although the Court has settled on a standard of review, it has not clearly 
defined what constitutes an emergency. The Court has held that article II, 
section 1(b) contains two distinct exceptions to the right to referendum: 
the first being “such laws as may be necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” and the second being 
laws for the “support of the state government and its existing public 
institutions.”80 The cases interpreting those exceptions are a story in 
contrast. The Court has offered a relatively clear definition of the support-
of-the-state-government exception by looking to the history and policy 
reasoning behind Washington’s referendum provision, but it has failed to 
do the same for the public safety exception. In Part V, this Comment 
                                                     
73. See State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281, 147 P. 1162 (1915). 
74. See id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 287, 147 P. at 1164 (quoting State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 316, 147 P. 
11, 16 (1915) (quotation omitted)). 
77. See id.  
78. Brislawn, 84 Wash. at 318, 147 P. at 16. 
79. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 807, 928 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1996); see also Wash. State 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Reed, 154 Wash. 2d 665, 675, 115 P.3d 301, 305 (2005). 
80. Farris v. Munro, 99 Wash. 2d 326, 335, 662 P.2d 821, 827 (1983). Essentially, the court has 
read the language as excepting “such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public peace, health or safety, [or] support of the state government . . . .” Id. (citation omitted) (citing 
State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash. 2d 320, 326, 363 P.2d 121, 125 (1961)). Thus, the second 
exception—the support-of-the-state-government exception—does not require immediacy or 
emergency. 
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suggests that the court should clarify the public safety exception by 
drawing on this policy reasoning. 
1. The Support-of-the-State-Government Exception 
In State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen,81 a case decided soon after 
Washington adopted the referendum power, the Washington State 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the support-of-the-state-
government exception. To ascertain the purpose and limitations of the 
exception, Justice Chadwick looked to the legislative history behind the 
adoption of Washington’s referendum power.82 He determined that the 
drafters of Washington’s initiative and referendum clause had looked to 
other states’ mistakes and successes for guidance.83 He therefore 
considered the history of other state’s referendum provisions to discern 
the drafters’ intent.84 
In particular, Justice Chadwick focused on the history of Oregon’s 
initiative and referendum provisions. Oregon adopted the initiative and 
referendum process years before Washington.85 But unlike in 
Washington, Oregon’s right to referendum was limited only in that it did 
not apply to “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public 
peace, health or safety”; it had no support-of-the-state-government 
exception.86 Justice Chadwick explained that because of this “unbridled 
license to refer legislation,” an Oregon state university’s operations were 
threatened by a referendum.87 Prior to the referendum, Oregon’s 
legislature passed an appropriations bill that funded the university 
annually for two years.88 The bill was subsequently blocked by a 
referendum petition, but the vote on the referendum measure was not 
scheduled to happen until almost a year-and-a-half later during the next 
general election.89 This created a significant issue: without funding from 
the appropriations bill, the university would have had to shut down (it was 
able to stay open only because professors agreed to work without pay).90 
                                                     
81. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915). 
82. Id. at 264, 148 P. at 29–30. 
83. Id. at 265, 148 P. at 30. 
84. Id. at 270, 148 P. at 32. 
85. Id. at 267, 148 P. at 30. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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Critically, the delay caused by the referendum process effectively quashed 
the original appropriations bill even before the referendum measure was 
placed on the ballot.91 Reasoning that the drafters intended to avoid such 
a situation,92 the Court concluded that the drafters added the language 
“support of the state government”93 to Washington’s emergency 
exception to exempt from referendum acts “for the financial support of 
the government and the public institutions of the state; that is, 
appropriation bills.”94 
Since Clausen, the Court has construed the support-of-the-state-
government exception to encompass more than appropriations 
measures.95 According to the Court, “support” includes any act that 
generates revenue for the state.96 
2. The Public Safety Exception 
Compared to the support-of-the-state-government exception, whether 
the public safety exception validly exempts a bill from referendum is far 
less clear. 
In State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath,97 a case decided in 1915, the Court 
construed the public safety exception narrowly. At issue was whether the 
Legislature could rely on the public safety exception to immediately enact 
a bill changing the composition of the Board of State Land 
Commissioners.98 The bill’s emergency clause had been vetoed by the 
Governor, but state legislators passed the bill over the Governor’s veto.99 
Oddly, the plaintiffs were not seeking a referendum.100 Rather, the 
                                                     
91. Id. 
92. Clausen, 85 Wash. at 267, 148 P. at 30. 
93. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
94. Clausen, 85 Wash. at 270, 148 P. at 31. The court summarized its position as follows:  
We may well assume that the people of this state had no intention of falling into the error that 
Oregon had made, and so framed their Constitution that our government and its institutions 
should not be put to the embarrassments that might follow an agitation which could be supported 
and a vote compelled by a number of the electors so small that it may be said to be merely 
nominal—6 per cent. of the vote cast at a previous election. It would seem that they could not 
have adopted plainer or simpler language than they did: ‘Support of the state government and its 
existing institutions.’ 
Id. at 267, 148 P. at 31. 
95. Farris v. Munro, 99 Wash. 2d 326, 336, 662 P.2d 821, 827 (1983). 
96. Id. (“[S]upport is not limited to appropriation measures; if it generates revenue for the state it 
is deemed support.”). 
97. 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915). 
98. Id. at 305, 147 P. at 12. 
99. Id. at 304, 147 P. at 12. 
100. Id. at 322, 147 P. at 18. 
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challenge came from board members whose positions were threatened; 
they argued that the act did not address an emergency and, therefore, could 
not take immediate effect.101 The Court agreed, holding that the 
emergency clause was invalid.102 The Court construed the public safety 
exception narrowly, stating that “[e]mergency, in the sense of the present 
Constitution, does not mean expediency, convenience, or best interest” 
and that “[t]here is no room for construction or speculation.”103 Looking 
to the bill, the court found that substituting certain state officers onto the 
board was hardly an emergency. 104 Further, the Court held that the 
functions of the State Land Commission would not be in any way 
interrupted by a vacancy in membership if the bill was not enacted 
immediately.105 Therefore, the bill was not necessary for the “immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health or safety.”106 In fact, the Court 
explained that “it may be said that it can make no real difference whether 
this law goes into effect at the present time or 90 days after the close of 
the session.”107 Thus, in this seminal case interpreting the public safety 
exception, the issue was not a close one.108 
CLEAN v. State was an entirely different story. In CLEAN, the Court 
evaluated whether the emergency clause in the 1995 Stadium Act, which 
imposed sales and use taxes to finance construction of a major league 
baseball stadium in Seattle, fit within the public safety exception.109 By 
passing the Stadium Act, the Legislature hoped to persuade the Mariners 
(the local major league baseball team) to remain in Seattle.110 Thus, the 
Court was asked to evaluate a bill that did not appear to fit within the 
narrow definition of the public safety exception adopted in Brislawn. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the Stadium Act was properly exempt 
                                                     
101. Id. at 305, 147 P. at 12. 
102. Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18. 
103. Id. at 318, 147 P. at 16–17. The court also stated that “the Constitution does not take into 
account convenience or necessity, except in so far as it touches the peace, health, and safety of the 
state.” Id. at 321, 147 P. at 17. 
104. Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18. 
105. Id. at 320, 147 P. at 17. 
106. Id. at 318, 147 P. at 16–17. 
107. Id. at 322, 147 P. at 18. 
108. There was a lack of consensus on the court; however, the point of disagreement was about 
whether judicial review was appropriate. The dissent argued that it was not for the court to decide 
whether the bill was emergency legislation because such a determination depends “entirely upon 
conditions, and facts considered by the Legislature, of which, in the very nature of things, we have no 
knowledge.” Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18 (Mount, J., dissenting).  
109. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 803, 928 P.2d 1054, 1064 (1996). 
110. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067. 
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from a referendum.111 Writing for the majority, Justice Alexander 
identified the emergency as a “clear and present danger” that the Seattle 
Mariners “would depart this state if prompt action was not taken to assure 
that a new publicly owned stadium would be developed in King 
County.”112 
In upholding the emergency clause, the majority rejected a narrow 
construction of the public safety exception. While acknowledging that the 
constitution does not define the terms “public peace, health or safety,” 
Justice Alexander began by asserting that “those terms have, however, 
been interpreted . . . as being synonymous with the exercise of the State’s 
‘police power.’”113 The opinion then adopted a broad definition of police 
power,114 noting that such power is limited only in that it “must reasonably 
tend to promote some interest of the State” and may not violate the 
constitution.115 However, an act is not exempt from a referendum simply 
because the Legislature properly exercised its police power; rather, “it is 
only a combination of the Legislature’s exercise of its police power and 
an emergency that cancels that right.”116 Therefore, the Court reasoned 
that an emergency clause is valid where (1) the act falls within the 
Legislature’s police power and (2) an emergency requires immediate 
action.117 
Although the Stadium Act did not respond to a traditional emergency, 
Justice Alexander nevertheless held that the bill addressed an emergency 
requiring immediate action.118 Justice Alexander described the issue of 
whether an emergency required immediate action as a “knotty question” 
and hedged his analysis by asserting that the Court gives the Legislature 
substantial deference when reviewing declarations of emergency.119 The 
Court then walked through the State’s argument that “an emergency 
existed because in the absence of prompt legislative action a valuable 
                                                     
111. Id. at 782, 928 P.2d at 1054. 
112. Id. at 808–09, 928 P.2d at 1067. 
113. Id. at 804, 928 P.2d at 1065. 
114. Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495, 506 
(2000) (noting that CLEAN’s “broad definition of the police power appears overinclusive and thus 
not analytically useful”). 
115. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 805, 928 P.2d at 1065. 
116. Id. at 805, 928 P.2d at 1065. 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 812, 928 P.2d at 1068. 
119. As discussed in Part III(A), the standard of review in CLEAN required that the legislature’s 
declaration of emergency be conclusive “‘unless the declaration on its face is obviously false.’” Id. at 
807, 928 P.2d at 1066 (quoting State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 778, 380 P.2d 
772, 735 (1963)). 
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community asset would be lost.”120 Acknowledging the plaintiffs’ 
contention that the lack of a baseball stadium could “hardly be equated 
with an immediate threat to the populace,” the Court agreed that the 
situation was not an emergency of “apocalyptic dimensions.”121 However, 
the absence of a traditional emergency was not dispositive. Importantly, 
the majority explained that “the Legislature was faced with a real 
emergency in the sense that the public purpose they sought to achieve by 
passing the Stadium Act would be unattainable” if the team was sold 
before the Legislature could assure the owners that a new stadium would 
be developed.122 Accordingly, the Court stated, “[i]n short, the Legislature 
was justified in concluding that quick action was needed to preserve the 
baseball franchise for the state of Washington and that any delay would 
lead to the sale of the Mariners, thereby defeating the purpose of the 
legislation.”123 The majority was therefore satisfied that the circumstances 
constituted an emergency for the purposes of article II, section 1(b).124 
Justice Guy, dissenting in part, did not agree that the Stadium Act 
qualified as emergency legislation.125 Although he agreed with the 
majority’s characterization of the exception itself, he took issue with the 
boilerplate emergency clause language used in the Stadium Act. He 
reasoned that the Legislature had failed to articulate the emergency in the 
act itself.126 He explained, “I will defer to the judgement of the Legislature 
whenever an ‘emergency’ situation, such as an immediately effective 
consequence, is explained in the preamble of an act or in the emergency 
clause itself, or is apparent from the nature of the act.”127 In other words, 
Justice Guy would require the Legislature to explain the need for 
immediate action somewhere in the act unless the emergency is 
“apparent.”128 
In a separate dissent, Justice Sanders argued for a narrower public 
safety exception and against the majority’s deferential approach.129 
                                                     
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. (emphasis added).  
124. Id. at 810, 928 P.2d at 1068. Justice Talmage concurred, deferring to the legislature’s 
declaration of emergency. He argued that “the most troublesome aspect of the dissent’s analysis . . . is 
the notion a legislative declaration of fact, such as an emergency, is subject to intrusive judicial 
review.” Id. at 815, 928 P.2d at 1070 (Tamalge J., concurring). 
125. Id. at 820, 928 P.2d at 1072. 
126. Id. at 821, 928 P.2d at 1073. 
127. Id.  
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 825, 928 P.2d at 1075. 
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According to Justice Sanders, a statute must meet three conditions to 
qualify for the public safety exception: “(1) the necessity must be 
immediate; (2) the statute must be necessary to solve the problem; and 
(3) the problem must be of a particular kind, i.e. a disruption of the ‘public 
peace,’ ‘health,’ or ‘safety.’”130 This test better adhered to precedent, 
Justice Sanders argued, because “[c]ontrary to the majority’s claims, [the 
Court had] consistently held that the emergency exception is much 
narrower than the police power.”131 Moreover, Justice Sanders believed 
that courts must evaluate an emergency declaration without deferring to 
the Legislature on the issue of emergency (he acknowledged that the 
courts defer to the Legislature’s factual findings).132 Applying these 
principles, Justice Sanders would have declared the emergency clause 
unconstitutional.133 
In evaluating the public safety exception, the Court has oscillated 
between a narrow interpretation of the language and a standard that gives 
the Legislature more flexibility to declare that a bill addresses an 
emergency. In CLEAN, the Court’s most recent in-depth look at the public 
safety exception, Justice Alexander adopted a broad standard that does not 
confine the exception to bills addressing traditional emergencies. Part V 
of this Comment argues that the essence of that holding is correct. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s opaque reasoning left the majority’s opinion 
vulnerable to criticism. 
IV. CRITICISM OF THE LEGISLATURE’S USE OF EMERGENCY 
CLAUSES AND THE DEBATE OVER PROCEDURAL 
CHANGES TO ENSURE THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO 
REFERENDUM 
The Legislature’s use of emergency clauses has been frequently 
criticized as encroaching on the people’s right to referendum.134 Some 
                                                     
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 831, 928 P.2d at 1078. 
132. Id. at 834–35, 928 P.2d at 1080 (“When faced with an emergency clause, the court must 
independently determine whether an emergency actually exists and whether the challenged statute 
actually addresses it.”); id. at 837, 928 P.2d at 1081 (“[T]he Legislature’s declaration of emergency 
goes not to legislative discretion, but to its constitutional power—the Legislature may circumvent the 
people’s right of referendum only if an emergency of a particular kind truly exists.”).  
133. Oddly, Justice Sanders was unconvinced that the Stadium Act was immediately necessary to 
keep the Mariners in Seattle. He appeared to miss the point that the promise to fund a stadium (not 
the actual construction) was the incentive necessary to persuade the team to stay. Rather, he argued 
that although the act-imposed taxes for the purpose of funding a stadium, it did “nothing to mandate 
construction of a stadium or keep a baseball team.” Id. at 823, 928 P.2d at 1074. 
134. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), 
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argue that any attempt to weaken the right to referendum should be 
thwarted.135 These advocates have pushed for procedural changes 
(requiring a supermajority to approve emergency legislation, for example) 
to strengthen the right to referendum and to weaken the Legislature’s 
ability to attach emergency clauses to bills.136 Before discussing these 
suggested procedural changes, however, it is vital to reiterate the purpose 
of the referendum itself. 
A. The Purpose of the Referendum 
The benefits of the referendum power typically fall into three 
categories. First, the referendum functions as a check on government by 
enabling the people to overturn legislative acts that they do not support.137 
In this way, the people are viewed as a “fourth branch” of government, 
offering a “valuable safety valve” to regulate the political system.138 
Moreover, the threat of referendum puts pressure on the Legislature to 
consider how the people will react to its actions.139 Second, the 
referendum diminishes the influence of political parties over 
government.140 Third, direct democracy—including referendum power—
encourages public involvement in government.141 The opportunity for 
involvement in the political process increases political awareness and 
public participation.142 The increase in awareness and participation is 
achieved by public discussion and debate over referendum measures and 
may result in a more politically informed, and less apathetic, electorate.143 
                                                     
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]; Page, supra note 20, at 223; Sharkansky, supra note 3. 
135. Page, supra note 20, at 223. 
136. Id. (“[A]ny attempts to weaken the referendum process should be rejected, and steps should 
be taken to prevent the unwarranted intrusion upon the people’s right to referendum.”). 
137. Id. at 234. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 235. 
141. Id. at 237. 
142. Id. at 234. 
143. Id. at 237. 
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B. Attempts at Regulating the Washington Legislature’s Use of 
Emergency Clauses 
Relying on these benefits, proponents of the right to referendum argue 
that the Legislature’s power to exempt bills should be checked.144 Many 
argue this check could be achieved by adding procedural hurdles to 
dissuade the Legislature from attaching an emergency clause to a bill.145 
Recommended procedural hurdles include adding a supermajority voting 
requirement to bills with emergency clauses, implementing more stringent 
judicial review, and requiring the Legislature to articulate facts supporting 
its finding of emergency.146 
Attempts to reform the Washington Legislature’s use of emergency 
clauses have come in the same form. For example, an unsuccessful Senate 
bill in 2013 proposed amending the Constitution to allow emergency 
clauses only as amendments to a bill and to require that such clauses be 
approved by 60% of each house of the Legislature.147 This bill died in the 
Senate Rules Committee and never made it to a vote on the senate floor.148 
V. A WORKABLE STANDARD TO EVALUATE EMERGENCY 
CLAUSES 
Aside from required procedural hurdles (gathering signatures, for 
example), the emergency exception is the sole limit on the people’s right 
to referendum. Yet, the Washington Constitution does not explain when 
an act is “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 
health or safety.”149 Moreover, despite allowing for judicial review of the 
Legislature’s use of an emergency clause, the definition of emergency has 
not been coherently resolved by the courts. The deferential standard of 
review in such cases contributes to a lack of clarity regarding when an 
emergency clause validly exempts a bill from referendum. This Comment 
                                                     
144. Id. at 271–79. 
145. Id.; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-
14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]. 
146. Page, supra note 20, at 271–79; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]. 
147. S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-
14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]. 
148. The bill was moved to the “X” file on March 3rd during the 2014 regular session. SJR 8206 - 
2013-14, Bill History: 2013 Regular Session, WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, 
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=8206&Year=2013 [https://perma.cc/7SJ7-B7G2]. 
149. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
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proposes a definition for the public safety exception to referendum in 
Washington. 
An appropriate definition of emergency legislation should be consistent 
with the policy reasoning behind the emergency exception. As discussed 
in Clausen, the drafters of Washington’s initiative and referendum 
provision intended to strike a balance between supporting direct 
democracy and allowing the Legislature to act quickly where swift action 
is warranted.150 On the one hand, the referendum process allows a small 
percentage of citizens who sign a petition to “circumvent the judgement 
of the elected body charged with representing all of the public.”151 On the 
other hand, the emergency exception prevents that small minority (now 
4% of voters)152 from undermining the ability of a majority of elected 
representatives to fulfill their legislative duty.153 This balance is 
intentional: as the Clausen Court explained, the emergency exception was 
designed to avoid circumstances where a small minority entirely nullifies 
the purpose of an act even before it is pushed to a popular vote.154 The 
Court applied this reasoning to the support-of-the-state-government 
exception,155 but the policy reasoning applies to the public safety 
exception as well.156 
Washington’s current case law examining the scope of the public safety 
exception also defines emergencies in relation to a bill’s purpose. In other 
words, the Court has recognized that an emergency may exist if enacting 
a bill immediately is necessary to achieve the purpose behind the piece of 
legislation. Indeed, this understanding of emergency is, in essence, where 
the Court was heading in CLEAN.157 Although he failed to clearly 
articulate this standard, Justice Alexander saw that a real emergency was 
present, even in the absence of a traditional crisis, because allowing a 
referendum would completely and permanently destroy the purpose of the 
bill. As he stated in CLEAN, the Stadium Act responded to a “real 
emergency in the sense that the public purpose [that the Legislature] 
sought to achieve by passing the Stadium Act would be unattainable” if a 
                                                     
150. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915). 
151. Lowe, supra note 14, at 631. 
152. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). 
153. Id. 
154. Clausen, 85 Wash. at 267, 148 P. at 30. 
155. Id. 
156. Lowe, supra note 14, at 595 (“In those jurisdictions where deferred laws are suspended until 
approved by the voters, the permissive referendum can nullify vital measures whose importance to 
society depends upon the certainty of timely enforcement.”). 
157. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996). 
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referendum was allowed.158 According to the Court, “the emergency that 
faced the Legislature was that the Seattle Mariners would be put up for 
sale on October 30 unless, prior to that date, the Legislature enacted [a bill 
assuring] the development of a new . . . baseball stadium in King 
County.”159 The Legislature reasonably believed that losing the Mariners 
would result in lost jobs, tax revenue, and recreational opportunities.160 
Therefore, the Court was persuaded that the threat of the Mariners leaving 
Seattle required immediate action. Because it faced a deadline, the 
Legislature’s ability to address the issue would have been entirely 
destroyed had the Legislature been unable to act immediately. Thus, for 
reasons consistent with the legislative intent behind the emergency 
exception, Justice Alexander found that a referendum would have 
inappropriately encroached on the Legislature’s ability to do its job.161 
Unfortunately, Justice Alexander’s opaque and hesitant reasoning left 
the majority’s opinion vulnerable to criticism.162 Despite departing from 
Brislawn’s narrow construction of the public safety exception, the 
majority did not acknowledge that it intended to craft a new standard. Nor 
did the opinion clearly outline the policy reasons supporting a broader 
standard. Given these omissions, it is unsurprising that critics found 
Justice Sanders’ dissent compelling—the majority failed to persuasively 
explain that the public safety exception should not be confined to the 
traditional emergencies relied upon in earlier cases such as Brislawn.163 
This Comment makes that argument clear. 
A. A Viable Standard for the Public Safety Exception 
This Comment suggests that the public safety exception should exempt 
a bill from a referendum if the bill accomplishes a public purpose that 
would be substantially thwarted if the Legislature was unable to act 
immediately. This definition covers a narrow set of circumstances where 
the Legislature’s objective would be irretrievably destroyed if a bill were 
referred to a public vote. It specifically encompasses two scenarios 
requiring prompt action: (1) cases where the harm is so severe that an 
                                                     
158. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067. 
159. Id. at 812, 928 P.2d at 1068. 
160. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067. 
161. See id.  
162. See Page, supra note 20, at 248 (criticizing Justice Alexander’s opinion in CLEAN and arguing 
that “[n]o effort was made to explain how a publicly funded stadium preserves the ‘public peace, 
health or safety’ . . . or how it fits into traditional police powers”). 
163. See id. 
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immediate response is necessary to mitigate ongoing damage, and 
(2) instances where the law’s purpose would be irreparably undermined if 
the effective date was delayed pending referral.164 The first scenario 
covers traditional emergencies (an ongoing public health crisis, for 
example),165 whereas the second scenario is about immediacy rather than 
severity. The second scenario would cover the situation in CLEAN v. State 
where immediate action was necessary to accomplish the act’s intended 
purpose—to persuade the Mariners to stay in Seattle.166 
B. Procedural Reforms to the Right to Referendum Are Inconsistent 
with the Emergency Exception’s Policy Objectives 
This Comment’s proposed standard aligns with the policy reasoning 
behind the emergency exception and is, therefore, a more appropriate 
solution than proposed procedural reforms. Advocates of such reforms 
argue that the Legislature’s power to exempt bills should be checked.167 
Some argue this check could be achieved by adding procedures to 
dissuade the Legislature from using emergency clauses (for example, a 
supermajority voting requirement), by implementing more stringent 
judicial review, or by requiring the Legislature to articulate facts 
supporting its finding of emergency.168 This section will address each of 
these suggestions. 
Procedural reforms aimed at dissuading the Legislature from using an 
emergency clause do not get to the heart of the matter: that the Legislature 
lacks direction about when the public safety exception should apply. 
Instead of giving direction to the Legislature, procedural solutions 
arbitrarily alter the referendum process in an attempt to prevent the 
Legislature from “misusing” the emergency exception. However, the 
Legislature cannot avoid misusing the exception without understanding 
its intended purpose. For example, rather than clarifying what an 
emergency should entail, a supermajority voting requirement would 
simply deter the Legislature from including an emergency clause in a bill 
                                                     
164. These scenarios are derived partially by the balancing test recommended by Lowe. Lowe, 
supra note 14, at 633. 
165. Id. at 595 n.21 (“[A] legislative act creating a remedy for victims of toxic chemicals or 
establishing a task force to develop a cure for AIDS will be of little value to the public if it is 
suspended pending the next general election.”). 
166. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054. 
167. See supra section IV.B. 
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regardless of the circumstances.169 While this requirement—which the 
Legislature has already rejected170—may “guard against the possibility 
that the legislature may attach an emergency clause to a bill solely to 
exempt it from referendum,”171 it does not solve the issue in a meaningful 
way. Essentially, this solution suggests that an emergency is what more 
legislators believe it is.172 But because the supermajority requirement does 
not provide an intelligible definition of emergency, there is no guarantee 
that this solution is consistent with the emergency exception’s policy 
objectives. 
By the same token, implementing strict judicial review or requiring the 
Legislature to articulate facts supporting a declaration of emergency are 
unconstructive solutions absent a workable definition of emergency. For 
example, even with stricter review, the courts cannot determine whether 
an emergency exists without understanding what should constitute an 
emergency. Unless, and until, the Court adopts a viable definition of 
emergency, these reforms will lead to arbitrary results. 
This Comment’s proposed standard provides the definition of 
emergency that procedural reforms lack. Instead of arbitrarily deterring 
the Legislature from using an emergency clause, the proposed standard 
would ensure that the Legislature exempts only bills that should take 
immediate effect. In this way, the proposed standard would better ensure 
that the Legislature’s use of an emergency clause is consistent with the 
intent behind Washington’s emergency exception. This Comment’s 
proposed standard also directly addresses the criticism that the Legislature 
uses sham emergency clauses simply to avoid referendum. By providing 
a clear definition of emergency, the proposed standard would (1) dissuade 
the Legislature from using sham emergency clauses and (2) enable the 
courts to identify when the Legislature has misused the public safety 
exception. 
This is not to say that procedural reforms have no place in improving 
Washington’s referendum process. To further ensure transparency and 
reviewability, the Legislature should include facts that support its 
declaration of emergency in the act itself.173 As Justice Guy identified in 
                                                     
169. Page, supra note 20, at 279. 
170. S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-
14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]. 
171. Page, supra note 20, at 280; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]. 
172. Page, supra note 20, at 279. 
173. Id. 
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his dissent in CLEAN, unless the emergency is apparent from the nature 
of the act itself, judicial review will be ineffective if the Legislature does 
not explain the emergency situation in the act.174 Requiring such an 
explanation will help ensure that the Legislature is held accountable and 
that courts can coherently evaluate whether the standard is met. 
CONCLUSION 
To strike the right balance between the people’s right to referendum 
and the Legislature’s need to effectuate certain laws immediately, the 
Court should reexamine the purpose of the emergency exception to the 
right to referendum in Washington. Without added transparency, the 
perception of improper legislative use of emergency clauses will continue. 
For this perception to change, the Legislature needs clear guidance to 
determine when a bill addressing a non-traditional emergency is properly 
exempt from a referendum. A viable standard must also prevent the 
Legislature from abusing the emergency clause to circumvent the people 
when immediate action is not actually necessary. This Comment argues 
that the public safety exception should exempt a bill from a referendum 
when the bill accomplishes a public purpose, where the purpose is 
explicitly stated in the legislation, and where that purpose would be 
substantially thwarted if the Legislature was unable to act immediately. In 
addition to traditional public health and disaster situations, this proposed 
standard covers a narrow set of circumstances where the Legislature’s 
ability to act on an issue would be destroyed if a bill were referred to a 
public vote. The recommended exception encompasses two scenarios 
requiring immediate action: (1) cases where the harm is so severe that 
immediate action is necessary to mitigate ongoing damage, and (2) cases 
where the law’s purpose would be irreparably undermined if the effective 
date were delayed pending referral. This understanding of emergency is 
consistent with Washington’s current case law examining the scope of the 
public safety exception and with the policy reasoning behind the Court’s 
interpretation of the support-of-the-state-government exception. 
Ultimately, this standard would provide a less unwieldy and more 
transparent method for courts to achieve the right result. 
 
                                                     
174. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 821, 928 P.2d 1054, 1073 (1996). 
